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Liberalising	the	economy	isn’t	enough	to	deal	with
Ethiopia’s	foreign	currency	crunch
Ethiopia’s	liberalisation	offensive,	opening	up	the	state	controlled	Ethio	telecom	and	Ethiopian	Airlines	to	private
investors,	has	taken	many	by	surprise.	Caught	between	a	watershed	political	transition	and	a	foreign	currency
crunch,	opinion	remains	divided	as	to	whether	the	move	primarily	signals	a	policy	shift	to	relatively	fast-pedalled
liberalisation	under	the	new	administration,	or	is	intended	to	serve	as	a	way	out	of	the	stranglehold	of	foreign
currency	scarcity.
It	is	easy	to	see	where	hopes	that	it	will	play	the	latter	role	are	hinging	on.
A	consortium	led	by	Italian	firm	Enel	Green	Power	(EGP)	is	expected	to	invest	about	$120	million	in	the	construction
of	a	100	Mw	solar	plant	in	Metehara,	Central	Ethiopia,	having	been	awarded	the	contract	in	October	2017.	Due	for
completion	in	2019,	the	project	is	expected	to	sell	power	to	the	state-owned	electricity	producer,	Ethiopian	Electric
Power,	within	the	framework	of	a	two-decade	long	Power	Purchase	Agreement.	Understandably,	such	private	sector
participation	is	viewed	as	a	pivotal	amplification	channel	for	the	inflow	of	hard	currency	into	the	economy.
Ethiopia’s	foreign	currency	woes,	however,	run	deeper	than	the	narrow	optic	of	liberalisation	would	suggest.	In
October	2017	the	National	Bank	of	Ethiopia	(the	country’s	central	bank)	not	only	hiked	interest	rates,	but,	more
importantly,	devalued	the	Birr	by	15.5	per	cent	to	exchange	at	27.3	units	to	the	dollar.	This	shock	policy	adjustment
came	at	a	time	when,	by	and	large,	the	monetary	environment	was	becoming	a	lot	more	accommodative	of	dovish
signals	in	sub-Saharan	Africa,	with	central	banks	beginning	to	unwind	the	tightening	cycle	that	had	prevailed	for	the
better	part	of	2014	–	2016.	If	there	was	a	canary	in	the	coalmine	with	regard	to	the	headwinds	the	economy	was
confronting,	run-away	inflation	and	a	foreign	currency	crunch,	that	was	it.
$6.3	in	servicing	import	obligations	for	every	$1.0	in	export	revenue
Between	2010	and	2016,	Ethiopia	grew	its	exports	by	a	paltry	1.9	per	cent	(compound	annual	growth	rate)	to	$2.8
billion.	In	the	same	period,	imports	surged	by	11.4	per	cent	to	$16.4	billion,	according	to	the	International	Trade
Centre.	In	essence,	whereas	the	economy	in	2010	needed	$3.7	to	service	import	demands	for	every	$1.0	it
generated	in	export	proceeds,	by	2016	this	had	risen	to	$6.3	for	every	$1.0	in	export	earnings.
To	put	this	into	perspective,	peer	economies	in	the	larger	Eastern	Africa	region	paint	a	different	picture	–	in	2010
Kenya	and	Tanzania	needed	$2.3	and	$2.0,	respectively,	to	meet	import	obligations	for	every	$1.0	they	made	in
export	earnings.	By	2016,	the	two	countries	needed	$2.9	and	$1.7,	respectively,	for	the	same	purpose.
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This	widening	trade	imbalance	begins	to	put	into	perspective	the	stranglehold	of	the	foreign	currency	shortage	that
Ethiopia	finds	itself	in	today	–	an	environment	of	almost	stunted	growth	in	export	earning	inflows	against	sustained
increase	in	import	servicing	outflows.
The	chart	below	plots	the	foreign	exchange	reserves,	months	of	import	cover	and	number	of	dollars	needed	to
service	import	obligations	for	every	dollar	earned	in	export	revenue	(size	of	the	bubble).	It	shows	that	by	2016,
Ethiopia’s	foreign	exchange	reserves	amounted	to	only	1.8	months	of	import	cover.	Important	to	note	is	that	the
International	Monetary	Fund’s	Reserve	Adequacy	Template	prescribes	relatively	higher	reserves	(5.0	–	6.8	months
of	import	cover)	for	countries	with	an	exchange	rate	system	similar	to	Ethiopia’s	i.e.	a	considerably	managed	float
system	that	sees	regular	intervention	by	the	central	bank	to	smoothen	out	volatility.	As	such,	1.8	months	of	cover
suggests	a	particularly	thin	buffer	against	shocks	for	the	economy,	a	fact	that	has	been	brought	to	bear	given	the
nosedive	in	the	price	of	coffee	(which	accounts	for	17	per	cent	of	export	earnings).
Figure	1.	Foreign	exchange	reserves	and	months	of	import	cover,	2016
Source:	Africa	Export-Import	Bank.	Note:	Size	of	bubble	denotes	the	number	of	dollars	required	to	service	import	obligations	for
every	dollar	in	export	earnings.
Figure	2.	International	price	of	coffee	(US	cents	per	lb)
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Source:	International	Coffee	Organization
The	export	market	concentration	bogeyman
The	Hirschman-Herfindahl	Index	(HHI)	is	a	tool	used	to	assess	the	concentration	of	a	country’s	trade	(import	and
export)	in	terms	of	product	and	markets.	The	index	ranges	from	0	to	1	referring	to	least	and	most	concentration,
respectively.	One	of	the	legacies	of	the	2014	–	2016	commodity	price	downturn	has	been	to	create,	in	sub-Saharan
Africa,	an	overwhelming	focus	on	the	need	to	de-risk	economies	through	diversification	of	export	products.
Unfortunately,	little	focus	has	been	channeled	towards	diversifying	export	markets	as	a	balancing	wheel	for	strong
and	sustainable	growth	momentum.
In	Ethiopia’s	case,	growing	export	market	concentration	has	presented	a	risk.	The	graph	below	shows	the	change	in
HHI,	both	product	and	market	concentration,	for	Ethiopia	and	peer	economies	between	2000	and	2014.	What	can	be
observed	is	that	whereas	Ethiopia,	like	most	peers,	has	diversified	export	products,	it	is	the	only	country	that	has
experienced	growing	concentration	in	its	export	markets.	This	growing	concentration	is	attributable	to	deepening
Sino-Ethiopian	ties,	which	have	seen	China	grow	to	account	for	13.4%	per	cent	of	Ethiopia’s	exports	in	2016
compared	to	1.1	per	cent	in	2001,	according	to	the	International	Trade	Centre.
This	concentration	has	left	Ethiopia	vulnerable	to	China’s	waning	appetite	for	imports,	which	declined	from	$1,949.9
billion	in	2013	to	$1,587.9	billion	in	2016.	At	the	same	time,	loans	extended	by	China	to	Africa	declined	from	a	peak
of	$16,669.3	million	in	2013	to	$11,764.3	million	in	2015	with	Ethiopia,	being	the	second	largest	recipient	of	loans
after	Angola,	bearing	the	brunt	of	the	tightened	purse	strings	(data	from	the	China-Africa	Research	Initiative).
Figure	3.	Export	product	and	market	concentration
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Source:	World	Integrated	Trade	Solution	database
Where	does	Ethiopia	go	from	here?
Ethiopia	finds	itself	in	a	bind.	On	one	hand,	anecdotal	evidence	suggests	that	the	gap	between	the	official	and
parallel	exchange	rate	continues	to	widen,	exchanging	at	35.0	–	35.5	units	to	the	dollar	as	of	9	June,	2018.	With	this
parallel	market	premium	in	mind,	it	is	likely	that	a	second,	albeit	smaller,	devaluation	of	the	Birr	is	within	the	National
Bank	of	Ethiopia’s	tool	box	for	the	short	to	medium-term	horizon.
On	the	other	hand,	the	devaluation-related	inflation	pass	through	effects,	at	a	time	of	double-digit	inflation,	takes
away	from	the	allure	of	such	a	stance.	More	consequentially,	this	moment	of	distress	could	present	a	turning	point	at
which	Ethiopia	begins	to	consider	a	future	in	which	the	country	decouples	itself	from	a	considerably	managed
exchange	rate	regime	in	favour	of	a	more	flexible	system.	Perhaps	a	more	flexible	regime	will	enhance	the	capacity
for	price	discovery	and	allow	for	early	detection	of	a	build-up	of	external	imbalance	vulnerabilities	should	similar
pressures	recur	in	the	future.
Figure	4.	Ethiopian	birr	to	the	US$	exchange	rate
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Source:	Bloomberg,	StratLink	Africa	Ltd
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Notes:
This	post	gives	the	views	of	its	authors,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.
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